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This Essay is a report from the battlefront. The battle is between
the forces of the constitution, a moderate form of politics, and the
politics based on the barrel of the gun. But the Essay is not about
what goes on at the front. It is more about how we should change
our thinking at headquarters to make the battle easier to fight.
It is an effort to reformulate our way of thinking about constitu-
tions and about what we do with constitutions, notably making
them, to serve the goals of constitutionalism not only in safe and
happy places (the "headquarters"), but also at the battlefront, where
the risk of war or other forms of conflict is substantial. This includes
both post-war, or post-conflict, situations and pre-war, or pre-
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conflict situations.' It is what I refer to as the edges of the constitu-
tional order. It is where some form of state of emergency is either at
hand or is a looming possibility.
The state of emergency of the kind we constitutionalists, and
moderates, should care about is not the one that so preoccupied Carl
Schmitt; it is not a situation where the very survival of a state is at
risk.2 As Czechoslovakia was breaking up, the survival of that state
was certainly at risk because it did not survive, but we were
nowhere close to the edges of constitutional order. There was no risk
of war, nor of a regime that would rely much more on coercion and
threat. Whatever the wisdom of the split, there was no constitution-
alist problem. A state of emergency arises, rather, when the very
survival of constitutional order is at risk. When that happens we
might need to sacrifice a state or two without shedding a constitu-
tionalist tear.
We inherit from the eighteenth century two forms of constitution-
alist catechism,' one French and the other American. They are
moderately different in content, and very different in style. The
French version, embodied in The Declaration of the Rights of Man
and Citizen,4 is in the form of briefly stated principles officially
adopted at the start of constitution making. The American version,
which we now know as The Federalist,5 is a set of essays making the
argument in favor of the constitution after it has been proposed.6
1. The making of the Iraq constitution serves as an example of a pre-conflict situation.
See ALI A. ALLAWI, THE OCCUPATION OF IRAQ: WINNING THE WAR, LOSING THE PEACE 219-32
(2007).
2. See CARL SCHMIT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT OF
SOVEREIGNTY xi-xxi (George Schwab trans., 1985).
3. On The Declaration as a catechism of principles for constitutional design, see Marcel
Gauchet, Droits de L'Homme, in DICTIONNAIRE CRITIQUEDE LAREVOLUTION FRANQAISE: IDRES
(Franvois Furet & Mona Ozouf eds., Frammarion 1992).
4. THE DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND THE CITIZEN (Irene Collins trans., Univ.
of Liverpool 1985); The Avalon Project at Yale Law School, Declaration of the Rights of
Man-1789, http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/rightsof.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2008).
5. See THE FEDERALIST NoS. 1, 6-9, 11-13, 15-17, 21-36, 59-61, 65-85 (Alexander
Hamilton), NOS. 10, 14, 18-20, 37-58, 62-63 (James Madison), NOS. 2-5, 64 (John Jay),
available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/federal/fed.htm.
6. The closest equivalent in Poland's constitution-making process at the time, Ignacy
Potocki's Zasady do Poprawy Formy Rzqdu [Principles for the Improvement of the Form of
Government], had no comparable impact because even supporters of the constitutional reform
complained the principles were too abstract and "metaphysical." JERZY LoJEK, KU NAPRAWIE
RZECZYPOSPOLITEJ: KONSTYTUCJA 3 MAJA 80 (1988).
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Our current stage of modernity, which is different from what
earlier counted as modern, but not postmodern either, is in need
both of such catechisms, and of larger theories that back them up.
The catechisms of the eighteenth century emerged from the battle
lines of the constitutional order of that period. What emerges from
the battle lines today should be a substantial modification, as well
as strengthening and generalization, of the constitutional cate-
chisms inherited from the eighteenth century. Repetition is not the
best form of building on the past. So this Essay, and the book project
of which it is a part, is my effort to build on the work of Madison
and Hamilton, Sieyes and Condorcet, and Koll4taj and Potocki
without necessarily retaining a great deal of what they actually
said.
Over the last decade the international community has given much
attention to the problems of constitution making in fragile states, in
quasi-states, for territories in which the state has collapsed, or for
territories that have never been properly governed by a state. To get
a feel for the diversity of this problem, consider three examples:
East Timor, from the withdrawal of Indonesian authorities in 1999
until its full independence;7 Iraq today;' and the European Union
since the Treaty of Maastricht or perhaps the Treaty of Nice.9
I was directly involved in East Timor and Iraq, and I think I have
learned something from this experience. I have become convinced
that among the chief problems facing us in such situations are not
just the obvious: the interests of the powerful have to be accommo-
dated, or else nothing happens. And when they are accommodated,
the result may not be as attractive or as effective as we might
wish-long term prospects of democracy, peace, and human rights
might suffer. Interests are often a problem, but so are some broadly
shared ideas relevant to constitution making in fragile states, which
often do not seem to serve anyone's interests. To fight those ideas
we need to shift from the immediate concerns with the crises often
7. See generally MICHAEL SMITH & MOREEN DEE, PEACEKEEPING IN EAST TIMOR: THE
PATH TO INDEPENDENCE (2003).
8. See ALLAWI, supra note 1, at 403-17.
9. See generally EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONALISM BEYOND THE STATE (J.H.H. Weiler &
Marlene Wind eds., 2003); MICHAEL LONGO, CONSTITUTIONALISING EUROPE: PROCESSES AND
PRACTICES (2006); J.H.H. WEILER, THE CONSTITUTION OF EUROPE: "DO THE NEW CLOTHES
HAVE AN EMPERORT' AND OTHER ESSAYS ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION (1999).
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associated with fragile states to a discussion at a higher level of
abstraction. And we need to look beyond law narrowly construed.
I. THE PHILADELPHIA MODEL AND ITS FALLACIES
Our conception of constitution making is dominated by images of
the hot summer in Philadelphia at the Constitutional Convention
of 1787, combined in some cases with those from another summer
during the French Revolution only two years later in Paris. Even
Giscard d'Estaing, of all people, daydreamed of Philadelphia and
Paris while sitting at the podium when he presided over the
Convention on the Future of Europe.' ° In 2002 he wrote:
Souvent, de l'estrade odi je pr6side ... je me dis que le spectacle
qui se d6roule devant mnes yeux n'est pas tellement different de
celui que David a d6peint dans la salle du Jeu de paume, lors du
serment fameux, ou de celui qui a pris place, de mai 6 septembre
1787, dans le hall de l'Ind6pendence de Philadelphie. n
Let us call this the Philadelphia model, even if it does not
correspond perfectly to what actually happened in Philadelphia.
According to this model a constitution is the supreme law of a state,
and we make a constitution when we write it and adopt it in
accordance with proper and legitimate procedures. And in a fragile
state one task of the constitution is to make the state less fragile, as
in Philadelphia where the Framers of the American Constitution
replaced a loose and unworkable confederation with a federal state.
The Philadelphia model suggests that this is how constitution
making in fragile states should proceed. This model, however, is
wrong in just about every way. It is wrong about what a constitution
is, wrong about how to make constitutions, and wrong again about
the desirable result of constitution making.
10. The Convention on the Future of Europe drafted the proposal for a European
constitution, later rejected in the French and the Dutch referenda. DEVELOPING A
CONSTITUTION FOR EUROPE 10-11 (Erik Oddvar Erikson et al. eds., 2004).
11. Val~ry Giscard d'Estaing, La Dernijre chance de I'Europe Unie, LE MONDE (Paris),
July 23, 2002 ("Often from the stage where I preside ... I tell myself that the spectacle before
my eyes is not that different from that painted by David of the famous Tennis Court Oath or




The first claim of the Philadelphia model is that a constitution is
the supreme law of a state. That may well describe the U.S.
Constitution, and perhaps Stalin's constitution for the USSR, but
it does not accurately describe the British constitution. The
description is problematic because Stalin's constitution was not a
constitution, whereas the British constitution is. Certainly that is
what one must believe in order to distinguish reality from fiction
and propaganda. The risk we take by defining a constitution as the
supreme law of a state is that we will take institutional Potemkin
villages as real. Because there is a document formally recognized as
the highest law, it is tempting to conclude that it must be a
constitution even if it is universally ignored. Conversely, we may
take as unreal constitutions that are not so easy to identify even if
they are real, in the manner of the British constitution.
Taking Potemkin villages seriously may seem harmless enough,
but it is not. The goal of constitutions is to achieve peace, democ-
racy, and protection of human rights. A document that only says it
guarantees all these things is not really a good substitute.
The world is full of institutional Potemkin villages. States that
are recognized by other states in the international system, but are
lacking both firepower and legitimacy, are really states in name
only. Other examples of Potemkin villages are property systems
that exist on paper only, while real economic life consists of efforts
to bypass them, and constitutions that serve as manifestos or false
advertising, but have otherwise no relationship to reality.
Part of the problem in these cases is that our concepts and
theories reflect a division of labor, intellectual and professional,
which has evolved in wealthy democratic countries, relatively well
protected from violence, and with strong commitments to democracy
and the rule of law. Lawyers study law and legal institutions,
whereas economists study markets. The easiest thing to do when we
try to help poor countries with fragile states, often on the brink of
or in the midst of civil war, is simply this: we transfer to the poor
country with a fragile state what works in the rich country with an
effective state, supported by concepts and theories developed in that
context. But this does not work, at least not often and not well. It
produces institutions that are Potemkin villages-all appearance
and no substance. Not just constitutions, but entire legal systems,
are largely fictitious because they are a combination of laws that are
2008] 1413
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too rigid, largely ignored, and in a world that operates independent
of law. So this is a larger problem not limited to constitutions. But
my objective is to demonstrate how to think about constitutions in
a way that will keep us from contributing to the construction of
these Potemkin villages.
So let me suggest an alternative way of thinking about constitu-
tions: they are commitments, and they are constitutions only to the
degree they are serious commitments. Hence the popularity in
discussions of constitutions and constitutionalism of the imagery of
Ulysses binding himself to the mast in order to hear the Sirens and
survive the experience,12 or the frequent repetition of the slogan
that in constitutions the people sober restrain the people drunk. 3
We make a commitment to something when we make changing our
minds more difficult than it would otherwise be. Without that
element, there is no constitution; it is all fiction and mirage. To
make a constitution is to make a certain kind of commitment. The
key questions are: to what are constitutions commitments, and what
form do these commitments take?
Let me suggest an answer which is I believe both faithful to the
constitutionalist tradition and practical in difficult situations, such
as fragile states. In a one sentence summary: they are commitments
to a certain form of moderate politics, which requires us to diminish
the use of the means of destruction in politics and to strengthen
impartial principle. Both commitments are largely legal in form,
which means they can be enforced by courts, or by court-like
institutions, such as the Constitutional Council in France. Their
legal form is not sufficient, however. And the two commitments
combined are the centerpiece of moderate politics.
Serious commitments develop incrementally and in stages. The
making of constitutions is no different. In the transition from
communism in Poland, for instance, we first had the commitments
12. See JON ELSTER, Imperfect Rationality: Ulysses and the Sirens, in ULYSSES AND THE
SIRENS: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY AND IRRATIONALITY 36,90 (ev. ed. 1985); JON ELSTER, Ulysses
Unbound: Constitutions as Constraints, in ULYSSES UNBOUND: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY,
PRECOMMITMENT AND CONSTRAINTS 88, 90 (2000).
13. Stephen Holmes, Precommitment and the Paradox of Democracy, in
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY 195, 196 (Jon Elster & Rune Slagstad eds., 1988) ("A
constitution is Peter sober while the electorate is Peter drunk. Citizens need a constitution,
just as Ulysses needed to be bound to his mast.... By binding themselves to rigid rules, they
can avoid tripping over their own feet.").
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of the Round Table agreements of early 1989, followed by a series of
agreements as an immediate response to the unexpected results of
the June 1989 elections.14 Then a series of new laws and amend-
ments to the Communist constitution were enacted at the end of
that year. 5 And that still was not the end of the slow development
of a new constitution. 6 There was after all, much later and really
much less important, an actual new constitution adopted in 1997.1'
The development of the South African constitution is also well
known. An interim constitution was adopted in 1994 that signifi-
cantly constrained the provisions of the permanent constitution,
putting the South African Constitutional Court in the unusual
position of ruling in 1996 that a new constitution is unconstitu-
tional.1
8
Iraq, too, provides us with an example of constitution making in
stages. It began with the adoption of the Transitional Administra-
tive Law (TAL), an interim constitution of doubtful legitimacy, but
quite workable as a transitional document.' 9 "Our pal the TAL" was
what a Kurdish member of the Iraqi government called it in a
conversation at a time during the summer of 2005, when the
constitutional negotiations were getting a bit frustrating, and TAL
looked good by comparison.2 ° The current constitution is the next
stage, but it is incomplete in some obvious ways; crucial details
about the workings of the second chamber of the federal legislature
and of the supreme court still need to be decided. So the Iraqi
14. MARK BRZEZINSKI, THE STRUGGLE FOR CONSTITUTIONALISM IN POLAND 83 (Palgrave
Macmillan 2000).
15. Id. at 87-89.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 127.
18. HEINZ KLUG, CONSTITUTING DEMOCRACY: LAW, GLOBALISM AND SOUTH AFRICA'S
POLITICAL RECONSTRUCTION 175-76 (2000).
19. Jonathan Morrow, Iraq's Constitutional Process II: An Opportunity Lost 3 (U.S. Inst.
of Peace, Special Report No. 155, 2005), available at http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/
sr155.pdf.
20. See id. at 21-22 (predicting in 2005 with regard to constitutional negotiations that
"[e]fforts to bridge the Sunni-Shia divide by tinkering with the constitutional text [were]
unlikely to be fruitful .... It is not clear that a constitutional consensus could be attained that
is different from the terms of the [TAL].").
21. Nathan J. Brown, The Final Draft of the Iraqi Constitution: Analysis and
Commentary, WEB COMMENT (Carnegie Endowment for Int'l Peace, Washington, D.C.), Sept.
16, 2005, at 9, 11, available at http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/FinalDraftSEPT16.
pdf.
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constitution has been developing in stages as well. Its development
has looked nothing like the images conjured by the Constitutional
Convention during that one hot summer in Philadelphia.
This brings me to one final deficiency of the Philadelphia model.
Constitution making should not be seen as necessarily a part of
state building. The product of a constitution need not be a state. A
commitment to principle and peace is often well served by effective
legitimate states, but it might be better served over any given
territory by alternative institutional arrangements, of which states
may be only component parts. The European Union could be a
prototype for such arrangements. Somalia may be an example of
such a territory. Iraq might be too.
So my four theses about constitution making in fragile states are
as follows:
" First, constitutions are not supreme law. Or, to use a
British phrase, the law of the constitution is not to be
identified with the constitution.
" Second, constitutions are commitments to moderation,
above all to diminish the use of the means of destruc-
tion, and to enhance impartial principles.
" Third, these commitments are likely to develop in
stages, not in one constitution-making convention
" Fourth, the result may not be a strengthened state, but
rather a union of states akin to the contemporary
European Union, or it may be a number of separate
states. Constitution making is not necessarily state
building.
II. CONSTITUTION AND LAW
Both law and drafting (that is, writing) contribute to constitu-
tions. But the constitution exists beyond the law and beyond
writing. And not all writing that contributes to the constitution is
the writing of law. The 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and
1416 [Vol. 49:1409
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Citizen12 and The Federalist" are written documents on the
borderline between law and non-law, although for more than thirty
years now the Declaration has certainly been a part of French law,
having earlier survived only in the limbo of preambles.24 These
works exemplify a form of writing that is clearly constitutional; they
are part of a constitutional commitment, even though they are not
law.
Some writing can come to be constitutional in stages, although it
was not such initially. One example is "propaganda constitutions,"
like the Soviet one.25 The right to secede was guaranteed to all
republics of the USSR by the text of the Soviet "constitution."26 But
this was a propaganda document with no relationship to the real
commitments, which were quite unconstitutional, of the Soviet
political system. This particular text, having been rightly dismissed
as irrelevant for decades, became quite real when the Soviet Union
collapsed.
More generally, political and social theory of a certain kind can
contribute to, and detract from, the constitution. Two kinds of
textual traditions may contribute to constitutions. One kind is an
ideological type, like liberal theory, except that some form of
moderate theory would be more appropriate. The other kind is a
certain type of intellectual discipline, like the political science of the
Madisonian type-a discipline that now exists only on the margins
of American political science.
So, in addition to "the law of the constitution," there is also the
text, or rather the texts of the constitution, with some overlap
between the two. Of course, there is also the legal text of the
constitution, but the idea of a constitution as a legal text and
nothing more is really too simple. It neglects the political difficulty
of the task of constitution making.
Seen from Dili, Erbil, and Baghdad, the British constitution
seems to me surprisingly relevant, though it is neglected by all. But
one is inclined to say that even the British do not really understand
22. THE DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND THE CITIZEN, supra note 4.
23. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
24. JOHN BELL, FRENCH CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 57 (1992).
25. See Eberhard Schneider, The Discussion of the New All-union Constitution in the
USSR, 31 SOvIET STuD. 523, 525-26 (1979).
26. USSR: SIXTY YEARS OF THE UNION 1922-1982, at 314 (1982).
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it. What is unique about the British constitution that makes it
relevant as we look from the edges of constitutional order? It has a
substantial unwritten component, but that surely does not matter.2 v
It is uncodified, so its content, even its written content, is subject to
the judgment of judges and scholars. 2' But that does not help
constitutionalism because it only makes it more difficult to teach
and to learn.
Everyone, including the British, seems to agree that the British
constitution is not entrenched. If that were true, then, by my
definition it would mean de Tocqueville was right-Britain does not
have a constitution.29 I think rather that, contrary to the almost
universal judgment of mankind, the British constitution is en-
trenched, though it is not legally entrenched, so the courts can have
no role in enforcing its more entrenched features. The entrenchment
depends on scholarly formulations and on the electorate. The
constitution is politically entrenched, and that is why it should be
always remembered when making constitutions in difficult settings.
In the end it is political entrenchment that matters, no matter how
much we reinforce it with legal entrenchment.
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONSTITUTIONS IN STAGES
Constitutions for the difficult situations along the edges of
constitutional order are going to be complex objects, and complex
objects require design and development in stages. If we take
seriously as a basic principle of rationality that all complex design
must be done in stages, then we must see any local constitution
making as a process drawing on two pasts: the local and the global.
That is to say, the local commitments are not only built on past local
commitments and loyalties, but also on global ones. They are built
on and modify the laws and the texts of the past, both local and
global. So every local constitution making is best seen as an
27. See COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM 31-39 (Norman Dorsen et al. eds., 2003).
28. See id.
29. Alexis de Tocqueville famously remarked: "In England the Parliament is
acknowledged to have the right to modify the Constitution. In England, therefore, the
Constitution can change constantly; or, rather, it does not exist. Parliament, besides being a
legislative body, is also a constituent one." ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMoCRAcY IN AMERICA
113 (Arthur Goldhammer trans., Library of America 2004).
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extension and elaboration of a global constitution-a global
commitment, albeit incomplete, to moderation.
If constitution making proceeds in stages, we must abandon
Jeffersonian ideas of periodic conventions in which each generation
gives itself a constitution. And we must abandon Siey~s's idea of the
people as the constituent power.3 ° We build on what exists, and on
what we inherit from the past.
The explicit entry of global institutions, such as the U.N. in East
Timor and other such places, into constitution making is simply a
more explicit form of the global nature of all local constitution
making. It could not be done if there were no principles of global
constitutionalism. If the local population insisted on a theocracy
there would be no way to engage the U.N.
Global institutions can enhance commitment both by providing
enforcement in the form of guns, and by modifying economic
incentives. There are also global constitutionalist principles, and
each extension of constitutionalism to a new territory is best seen
as an incremental part of a global transition to a constitutional
order. It is best seen that way because the local constitution making
builds on global precedents. The use of foreign materials in The
Federalist has now developed into a very extensive practice of
constitutional borrowing, constitutional learning, and constitutional
precedent following. But, of course, this point is not limited to the
moment of "constitution making" because there is no such moment.
It extends to the deepest interstices of constitutional jurisprudence.
So global constitutionalism needs to be formulated at various levels:
the jurisprudential level, the drafting level, and the political theory
level. The particular needs to be integrated with the general, and
the local with the global.
Constitutions are also crucially local. They build incrementally on
already existing local commitments and loyalties and, thus, are
bound to modify global constitutionalism. The revolutionary
tradition of earlier modernity is at a distinct disadvantage here,
aiming as it does to replace the inherited institutions with some-
thing entirely new." If you engage in complex design in stages, then
30. For a discussion on Siey~s's idea of the people as the constituent power, see Bronislaw
Baczko, The Social Contract of the French: Siey4s and Rousseau, 60 J. MODERN HIST. S98,
S98-S125 (Supp. 1988).
31. For a discussion of Thomas Jefferson's view that each generation has a natural right
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you do not want to replace what came before with something
entirely different imposed by a "constitutional convention." You
build on and modify existing commitments and loyalties. You build
a constitution "from below."
Constitution making "from above" will insist that it also result in
nation building. It is part of the statist program of often forced
assimilation that attempts to create nations of all people whom the
latest war settlement put within the boundaries of a given state.
Constitutionalism "from below" is by comparison a program based
on a serious commitment to self determination, and not just a legal
commitment such as we find, for example, in the text of the
constitution of Ethiopia." Such a serious commitment would allow
the boundaries of states to reflect underlying potential for constitu-
tionalism, resulting in a program of the constitutionalization of
boundaries. Within Switzerland this is already possible, and
perhaps it is also possible within the EU.33 It is much more difficult
elsewhere. So we need a global constitutional order at least
sufficient for the constitutionalization of boundaries. Perhaps the
best example of such a process in action is the secession of the
Canton of Jura from the Canton of Bern in Switzerland through a




It is sometimes said that modern constitutionalism is applied
liberalism. 35 But, first, that does not get the relationship right.
to start the world anew and that no generation of men has a right to bind another, see
Richard K Matthews, The Radical Political Philosophy of Thomas Jefferson: An Essay in
Retrieval, 28 MIDWEST STUD. PHIL. 37, 48-51 (2004).
32. For a discussion of Ethiopia's legal commitment to self-determination embodied in its
constitution, see Kidane Mengisteab, New Approaches to State Building in Africa: The Case
of Ethiopia's Ethnic-based Federalism, 40 AFR. STUD. REV. 111, 122-29 (1997).
33. See JONATHAN STEINBERG, WHY SWITZERLAND? 254 (2d ed. 1996) ("Switzerland is not
simply another rich, small state in the heart of Europe. It is the living expression of a set of
ideas, which may be summed up: although the will of the majority makes law and constitutes
the only true sovereign authority, the minorities, however small, have inalienable rights. The
dilemma of majority will and minority rights can be overcome by the ingenuity of men.").
34. Id. at 96-97.
35. On the relationship between liberalism and modern constitutionalism, see STEPHEN
HOLMES, PASSIONS AND CONSTRAINT: ON THE THEORY OF LIBERAL DEMocRAcY 5-10 (1995);
1420 [Vol. 49:1409
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Various forms of codification of design principles must be integrated
with design. We should have unity of theory and practice, but the
influence in such unity goes both ways. So liberal theory also
attempts to codify constitutionalist practice. And, second, constitu-
tionalist practice, especially at the edges of constitutional order,
could be better served by a different form of political theory, a
theory of moderation rather than liberalism. 6
A workable and defensible definition of moderation would include
three elements. First, moderation requires some form of moral
pluralism. There are multiple good ends, and we should aspire to
the most attractive balance between them." Hence, moderates are
attracted to a variety of metaphors of balance and center, like
avoiding extremes and choosing the golden mean. The aim is always
to find the most attractive and appropriate balance, and hence to
support the center against the unbalanced extremes. At the heart
of constitutionalist practice, whether in constitution making,
amending, or deciding cases under the constitution, is balancing,
and the search for attractive forms of balance.38 And despite what
is often said, it is not the balancing of interests but rather the
balancing of rights and legitimate interests.
Liberal theory, by contrast, allows singling out some principles as
supreme, and often encourages the search for the single principle
that can govern the political system,39 whether it is a unitary
principle along the lines of John Stuart Mill's utilitarianism40 or a
more complex ordering of principles along the lines of John Rawls's
DONALD S. LuTz, PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 15-22 (2006).
36. Moderation, as I conceive it, can be seen as a modification of a broadly conceived
republican tradition. On this broad republicanism, see PHILIP PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM: A
THEORY OF FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENT (1997) and MAURIZIO VIRIOLI, REPUBLICANISM
(Antony Shugaar trans., Hill and Wang 2002).
37. See William A. Galston, Value Pluralism and Liberal Political Theory, 93 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 769, 770-72 (1999) (briefly describing the basic principles of pluralism).
38. See David Beatty, THE ULTIMATE RULE OF LAW 159-88 (2004) (discussing
proportionality as a theory of constitutional interpretation).
39. See JOHN GRAY, ISAIAH BERLIN 141-68 (1996) (arguing that value pluralism and
liberalism are incompatible theories). But see Galston, supra note 37, at 769 ('Many people
(ordinary citizens as well as academics) are both value pluralists and political liberals and see
these positions as mutually supportive.").
40. See generally J.S. MILL, UTILITARIANISM (Roger Crisp ed., Oxford Philosophical Texts
1998).
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theory of justice.4' Liberal theory distorts constitutionalist practice
in a way that is distinctly unhelpful at the edges of constitutional
order. The fundamental value is moderation.
Isaiah Berlin has recently been the most influential moral
pluralist.42 Other prominent moral pluralists before the current
popularity of the idea, all with deep twentieth century roots in the
area between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany, include the
6migr6 Russian Sergei Hessen and the Polish philosopher Leszek
Kolakowski,43 whose pluralist liberal conservative socialism neatly
summarized the political impulses of the glory days of Solidarity's
struggle against communism.4 4 Utilitarianism, net benefit maximi-
zation, and Rawls's theory of justice are good examples of non-
pluralist thought.45
Moderation requires, second, both recognizing the pervasive
power of destruction and violence, and making the defeat of
destruction a central goal. Destruction and violence in moderation
is not a moderate idea. So the second defining aspect of moderation
is recognizing violence and destruction as the enemy. A moderate
aims to destroy destruction, and failing that, to enslave it by
subjecting it to the governance of a complex order of principles.
Confucians, constitutionalists, and pacifists take the problem of
destruction and the threat of destruction seriously.46 Deweyan
problem solvers and deliberative democrats typically do not.47
41. See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (rev. ed., Harvard Univ. Press 1999)
(1971).
42. See GRAY, supra note 39 ("Isaiah Berlin is often compared to David Hume."). See
generally ISAIAH BERLIN, THE CROOKED TIMBER OF HUMANITY: CHAPTERS IN THE HISTORY OF
IDEAS (Henry Hardy ed., 1991).
43. See Andrzej Walicki, My LhdiMeister and the Pluralism of Values, 16 DIALOGUE AND
UNIVERSALISM 101-08 (Guy Russell trans., 2006) (recognizing the contributions of Sergei
Hessen, Isaiah Berlin, and Leszek Kolakowski to the theory of value pluralism).
44. See Leszek Kolakowski, How To Be a Conservative-Liberal Socialist, in ENCOUNTER,
46-47 (1978); Marek Leszkowski, GJ6wne Nurty Solidarnoci [Main Currents of Solidarity],
1(8) KONTAKT 7-10 (1982).
45. See generally ANTHONY BOARDMAN ET AL., COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS: CONCEPTS AND
PRACTICE (3d ed. 2005); WILL KYMLICKA, CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY: AN
INTRODUCTION (2d ed. 2002); MILL, supra note 40; RAWLS, supra note 41.
46. See JOSEPH GRANGE, JOHN DEWEY, CONFUCIUS, AND GLOBAL PHILOSOPHY 88 (2004).
47. On Dewey's problem with evil and human destructiveness, see PHILIP SELZNICK,
MORAL COMMONWEALTH: SOCIAL THEORY AND THE PROMISE OF COMMUNITY 172-74 (1992)
("Dewey gave short shift to the deficiencies of human nature and the recalcitrance of
institutions."). On deliberative democracy, see DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY (James Bohman &
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A third element of moderation is a commitment to reason,
rationality, or at least reasonableness, which, among other things,
gives moderates a fondness for deliberation, though only a moderate
fondness.
B. The Consociational and Centripetal Models
Discussion of the design of government institutions, including
constitutions and electoral laws, in deeply divided societies has
itself been deeply divided. The divide is mainly between advocates
of consociational democracy, most notably Arend Lijphart, and
advocates of what some have called the centripetal approach, most
prominently advocated by Donald Horowitz.48 Both approaches favor
moderation.49 One does so by relying more on institutions to supply
"the defect of better motives."5 ° The other relies more on the
promotion of politicians with the right kind of motives.51 Both can
be better evaluated when we articulate more fully our ideal of
moderation, which certainly must include more than the willingness
to compromise with one's opponents.
William Rehg eds., 1997); DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY (Jon Elster ed., 1998); DEMOCRACY
(David Estlund ed., 2002). In all these discussions, human destructiveness is not a looming
concern.
48. See DONALD HOROWITZ, ETHNIC GROUPS IN CONFLICT 566-76 (1985) (arguing that
Lijphart and other consociational theorists have not recognized the potential consequences
of their policy recommendations); Donald Horowitz, Conciliatory Institutions and
Constitutional Processes in Post-Conflict States, 49WM. &MARYL. REV. 1213, 1215-20 (2008).
But see Arend Lijphart, Constitutional Design for Divided Societies, 15 J. DEMOCRACY 96, 96-
109 (2004) (responding to consociationalism's critics, especially Horowitz); John McGarry &
Brendan O'Leary, Consociational Theory, Northern Ireland's Conflict, and its Agreement. Part
1: What Consociationalists Can Learn from Northern Ireland, 41 GOV'T & OPPOSITION 43, 43-
63 (2006) [hereinafter McGarry & O'Leary, Part 1] (affirming that consociationalism is a
valuable political theory, despite the fact that it suffers from some important weaknesses);
John McGarry & Brendan O'Leary, Consociational Theory, Northern Ireland's Conflict, and
its Agreement 2: What Critics of Consociation Can Learn from Northern Ireland, 41 GOV'T &
OPPOSITION 249, 249-77 (2006) [hereinafter McGarry & O'Leary, Part 2] (highlighting the
serious weaknesses in anticonsociational arguments).
49. See, e.g., Adriano Pappalardo, The Conditions for Consociational Democracy: A Logical
and Empirical Critique, 9 EUR. J. POL. SCI. 365, 375-76 (1981) (noting how the consociational
method favors moderation).
50. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 252 (James Madison) (Terence Ball ed., Cambridge Univ.
Press 2003).
51. Donald L. Horowitz, Electoral Systems: A Primer for Decision Makers, 14 J.
DEMOCRACY 115, 118 (2003).
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A consociational democracy is a regime with two defining
characteristics, as most advocates would see it, and a third impor-
tant feature. 2 The defining characteristics are those that protect
each of the groups in the polity from the others. First, each group is
given as much autonomy over its own affairs as is feasible.53 Second,
each group is given veto power (or partial veto power) in the decision
making of the central government.5 4 The combination of these two
features acts to protect each group from possible harm by the others.
The third principle of consociational democracy is the principle of
proportionality: positions in the legislature, the civilian bureau-
cracy, the police and the military, and other centers of power are
allocated proportionally to demographic strength.55 But what really
matters here, above all, is the ability of each group to prevent any
of these powerful agencies from doing it damage. For example, it is
important to a minority that it be proportionately, and thus, fairly,
represented in the military.56 But it is also important that the
command authority of the group's members in the armed forces, and
the location where these forces are stationed, is such that they can
prevent the forces from being used against the group.
A consociational democracy is, above all, a regime that aims to
protect the contending groups in a country. You can think of it as a
peace treaty extended into the workings of a government. To do so
effectively, the regime must accommodate all groups that might
threaten peace, especially extremist groups.57
The centripetal approach is not so inclusive. 8 It proposes various
institutional designs, especially electoral laws, that promote
moderate politicians who are willing to compromise with other
groups at the expense of extremists. 9 This approach can live with
52. See McGarry & O'Leary, Part 1, supra note 48, at 43-44; see also Lijphart, supra note
48, at 97.
53. McGarry & O'Leary, Part 1, supra note 48, at 44.
54. Id.
55. Id.; see also Lijphart, supra note 48, at 97, 103, 105.
56. Lijphart, supra note 48, at 105.
57. See McGarry & O'Leary, Part 2, supra note 48, at 262 ("Excluded radicals can
destabilize power-sharing institutions .... Excluded radicals may engage in violence, creating
a polarized atmosphere that pressurizes moderates and makes compromise difficult.").
58. See id.
59. Lijphart, supra note 48, at 98.
1424 [Vol. 49:1409
CONSTITUTION MAKING
majoritarian democracy, as long as the ruling majority is an inter-
ethnic coalition of moderates.60
Consociationalism is an instrument of moderation because
making all sides secure, and convincing them that they are secure,
blocks the most common path to war in deeply divided societ-
ies--one driven by the "logic of fear,"'" which I explain below. 2 In
situations in which the "logic of fear" is the dominant reality, there
is no room for moderate politicians, and institutions that favor them
will not succeed. But, to the extent that moderation has two aspects,
the suppression of human destructiveness and the promotion of
multiple legitimate ends, consociationalism by itself is clearly
incomplete. When Lijphart himself wrote down his constitutional
recommendations for deeply divided societies, 3 he outlined his
consociational program and stopped there, neglecting, for example,
to add a constitutional court.' A full-blown moderate program
would be mainly consociational in situations dominated by the "logic
of fear," but not necessarily elsewhere. And it would recognize at all
times that moderation is not simply a negative view-a fight against
violence and destruction. It is also an effort to promote multiple
legitimate ends. So it needs to strengthen and elaborate on what
I call below "neutral" ground. And among notable denizens of this
neutral ground, in addition to a broad variety of individuals and
institutions, such as constitutional courts, we will find those
heroes and heroines of Horowitz's centripetalism, the moderate
politicians.6 5
C. Complex Demos
A good way to illustrate both the underlying shared commitment
to moderation of the consociational and centripetal approaches, and
the likely differences in the range of their applicability, is to
consider a generalization of the usual simple majoritarian model of
60. See id.
61. For a discussion of how a group's fear of domination can play out in a divided society,
see HOROWITZ, supra note 48, at 187-90.
62. See infra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
63. Lijphart, supra note 48, at 99-106.
64. See id.
65. See Horowitz, supra note 51.
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democracy that so many people carry around in their heads, and
which some explicitly advocate.66
Much of democratic thought and practice, born in an age of
simplicity, assumes a simple demos, making decisions by a simple
majority." So, democracy turns into majoritarian democracy. But,
as Lijphart and others have shown, the actual practice of democra-
cies, especially in deeply divided societies, is often more consensual,
and relies on separation of powers in a way that a simple majority
rule does not.68 This can be seen as a practical adaptation to difficult
situations. In part, it is unquestionably that. But many of these
practices can also be seen as reflecting a recognition of the complex-
ity of the demos, a complexity that requires that we reformulate
more deeply the way we think about democracy. We understand
little of the nature and the role of a complex demos in a democracy.
So, for example, participants in the discussions about the present
and future prospects of democracy in the European Union worry
about the absence of a European demos, 9 a demos being seen as a
prerequisite to democracy. But all these discussions assume that a
simple demos is the only possible demos.
To evaluate the various claims in these discussions, we need a
notion of a demos that is relevant to the task at hand and that
allows for complexity. Let us say a group is a demos to the extent its
members are willing to sacrifice when they are outvoted. They are
willing to be a loyal minority. And they are willing to restrain
themselves also when they are the democratic winners, refraining
from imposing their will to the fullest extent possible. Obviously,
democracy will work more easily in a group to the extent that the
group is a demos. Nations tend to be good demoi. Europeans as a
group are not; they are too deeply divided among themselves.7 ° And
66. See TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 29, at 283 ("It is the very essence of democratic
government that the majority has absolute sway, for in a democracy nothing resists the
majority.").
67. See ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 34-62 (expanded ed. 2006)
(discussing the implicit assumptions of "populistic" democracy).
68. See generally Arend Lijphart, Consociational Democracy, 21 WORLD POL. 207 (1969).
69. For a discussion of the European demos, see Matthew J. Gabel & Christopher J.
Anderson, Exploring the European Demos (Or Lack Thereof): The Structure of Citizen
Attitudes and the European Political Space (CEuS, Working Paper No. 2001/4, 2001),
available at http://www.monnet-centre.uni-bremen.de/pdf/wp/2001-4-Gabel-Anderson.pdf.
70. See, e.g., Renaud Dehousse, Beyond Representative Democracy: Constitutionalism in
a Polycentric Polity, in EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONALISM BEYOND THE STATE, supra note 9, at
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the populations of many deeply divided states such as Cyprus,
Lebanon, Iraq, and so many others also do not seem to be good
demoi. 71 This all follows if the decision-making procedure the demos
uses is simple majority vote.
In a simple demos there are only two kinds of politically relevant
boundaries: the boundary separating members from nonmembers
and boundaries separating each individual member from every
other member. To think seriously about a democracy that can work
in difficult circumstances like Iraq or Somalia, for example, we
need to have a more general conception of what a demos can be. It
can have various levels and types of complexity. And democratic
procedures must operate at these various levels of complexity. The
simple demos of the now dominant view of democracy, with its
simple majority rule, must be seen for what it is: a very special case.
Democratic theory must consider a demos with various kinds of
internal boundaries.
We can define the structure of a demos by the location and depth
of the boundaries within it-the structure of its internal divisions.
These may be religious, ethnic, or class divisions; what matters for
this account of the internal structure of the demos is simply where
the boundaries are and how deep they are. If a boundary has no
depth, then it does not exist at all. Maximum depth, on the other
hand, indicates a boundary that justifies complete mutual independ-
ence of the groups that the boundary divides. The maximally deep
boundary separates two distinct demoi. The many boundaries of
intermediate depth give structure to a complex demos.
Another way to clarify the notion of depth of boundary is to
consider the nature of the democratic procedures appropriate for a
complex demos. Let us say that we have an encompassing demos
divided into sub-demoi and, for simplicity, let us assume that all
internal boundaries are equally deep. If the internal boundaries are
135; Anthony Smith, National Identity and the Idea of European Unity, in THE QUESTION OF
EUROPE 319 (Peter Gowan & Perry Anderson eds., 1997) ("A common European cultural
identity, if such there be, does not yet have its counterpart on the political level; to date, each
state of the European Community has placed its perceived national interests and self-images
above a concerted European policy based on a single presumed European interest and self-
image.").
71. See Daniel Byman, Constructing a Democratic Iraq: Challenges and Opportunities, 28
INT'L SEC. 47, 55 n.32 (2003) (noting the consociationalism failures of Cyprus, Lebanon, and
Nigeria).
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maximally deep, then decisions in the encompassing demos should
be made using a consociational democratic procedure. A decision is
made if a majority in each sub-demos agrees. We also have then the
support of the majority in the encompassing demos. When, in a
system of sovereign territorial states, the states all become demo-
cratic, their treaties will be adopted roughly by this procedure.
Consociational democracy works on the basis of this rule within a
state. At the other extreme of boundary depth, we will still require
a majority of the encompassing demos, but the requirement of
support from within each sub-demos will go down to zero. We have
then the maximally simple encompassing demos ruled by a simple
majority. In such a society, the sub-demoi effectively do not exist
politically.
Complexity comes in between these two extremes. At maximum
depth of boundaries, we require just over 50 percent of the votes
from each of the sub-demoi. As the depth declines, the requirement
goes down. Let us take the 40 percent level as an example. Now the
boundaries are substantially less deep than in the consociational
case. The decision rule is that a proposal is adopted if it gains a
majority in the encompassing demos and at least 40 percent in each
sub-demos. In the consociational democratic procedure, each sub-
demos has a majoritarian veto. A majority of any sub-demos has the
capacity to block any proposal. When we move from depth measured
at 50 percent to depth measured at 40 percent, simple majorities in
sub-demoi no longer have the capacity to block proposals: a group
needs just over 60 percent to block. We can describe this shift in
terms of the degree of solidarity assumed across the internal
boundaries within the demos. The consociational procedure assumes
no solidarity. The 40 percent procedure assumes some.
I hope it is clear how the story continues. As the internal
boundaries lose depth, the blocking majority required for a sub-
demos to veto a proposal becomes higher. At the extreme, no voting
majority, not even unanimity, is sufficient, and the encompassing
demos loses its internal structure entirely and becomes a simple
demos, ruled by simple majority vote. So, at one extreme of a
democracy with a complex demos, we have its consociational form,
and at the other extreme, we have a single simple demos. In
between, we have the rules most characteristic of a complex demos
that we find, for example, in the method of electing presidents in
1428 [Vol. 49:1409
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Nigeria," or the decision-making procedures negotiated in the Good
Friday Agreements for Northern Ireland.7
Discussing in this way a democratic decision-making rule for a
complex demos, I have said nothing about federalism and the
decision-making rules federal systems adopt. Yet, seemingly,
federal systems are precisely those that accept having a complex
demos. Unfortunately, this is not exactly right. Federal systems are
complex polities, to be sure, but, in federalism, the complexity is at
the level of states, not demoi. A federal system has at least two
entrenched levels of authority, so its central government has both
direct representation of citizens, and a representation of the
member states or provinces. Federal law may apply like a treaty to
the member states, and it also applies directly to citizens; it has a
direct effect on citizens. And the typical democratic procedure in a
federal state is not the procedure I outlined above for complex
demoi. It is rather some version of the procedure proposed in the
current draft of the EU Constitutional Treaty.74 This is usually
called a double majority procedure, which requires for adoption the
support through their representatives of both the majority, or
supermajority, of the population of the encompassing demos (the EU
in this case) and the majority, or supermajority, of the sub-demoi
(the member states of the EU in this case). The U.S. Constitution
adopts a similar procedure. To become law, a proposal needs to be
supported by a majority of the representatives of the people, the
members of the House of Representatives, and a majority of the
representatives of the states, the members of the Senate.75
In a double majority system, or even in any double supermajority
system, an individual state and its people can be defeated no matter
how intense and unanimous is their opposition to a proposal. Such
systems are compromises between an encompassing unitary state
and a collection of independent unitary states. Therefore, states
enter into the calculations of the decision-making procedure because
72. For a discussion of the method of electing presidents in Nigeria, see HOROWITZ, supra
note 48, at 635-38.
73. See McGarry & O'Leary, Part 1, supra note 48, at 46-47; see also Brendan O'Leary,
The Nature of the Agreement, 22 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1628, 1628 (1999) (describing the Good
Friday Agreement).
74. Treaty of Lisbon, Dec. 13, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 50 (amending the treaty on European
Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community).
75. U.S. CONST. art. I.
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a proposal needs the support of the majority of the states to pass.
But, a democratic procedure should more directly reflect the
complexity of the underlying demos, and it should protect each of its
components.
The dominant view of democracy takes the very special case of
simple democracy as normative, and takes the complex case as a
necessary modification for difficult situations. On reflection, this
seems to be an odd view. Our general conception of democracy as
popular sovereignty must allow for a people with various forms of
internal structure, not just the simplest structure. It should allow
for a complex demos. And when we construct such a conception, it
becomes clear that the consociational form of democracy is most
appropriate when the internal divisions are deepest. Centripetal
forms are better when the internal divisions weaken. And simple
majoritarian democracy is best when there are no internal divisions
of any importance.
But, according to my view, moderation requires more than either
one of these perspectives has to offer. It requires a systematic
commitment to diminish the power of human destructiveness, and
to enhance the power of the multiple legitimate ends.
IV. HUMAN DESTRUCTIVE CAPACITY
I will discuss first the commitment to diminish the reliance on the
means of destruction in politics. What does it mean to use guns less?
We begin an answer by noting that there are two rather different
uses of guns in politics, and both are at issue here. I use a gun in
one way when I kill you with it. That is a common use of guns. But
even more common is a different use: I threaten you with death if
you do not give me your wallet. You remain alive, but I become
richer. This is what we know as coercion. Both violence and coercion
are pervasive in politics."6 Both uses of guns are common. Constitu-
tions, and constitutionalism more broadly, involve a commitment to
diminish both uses.
76. See Timo Airaksinen, An Analysis of Coercion, J. PEACE RES. 213, 213-15 (1998)
(discussing coercion and its effect on society).
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Traditionally, this has created some tension. Faced with a threat
of a Hobbesian war of all against all,77 or just with a bloody and
protracted civil war, another use of guns, it is natural to turn to
what we might call a Hobbesian solution, a hegemonic power
capable of rule through overwhelming coercion.7" So, to take an
example from my own experience, faced with massive violence and
destruction in East Timor as a result of the independence referen-
dum in 1999, 71 the United Nations Security Council created what
seemed like a perfectly Hobbesian solution to a Hobbesian situation.
It established the United Nations Transitional Administration in
East Timor (UNTAET) to govern the country, and gave its head, the
Special Representative of the Secretary General, all executive,
legislative, and judicial power.80 Not even the most absolute of
monarchs ever claimed such powers. On the surface, and at least
transitionally, massive war was replaced with massive coercion.
But a constitution must be a commitment to limit both actual
violence and coercion. Traditional constitutionalism is unbalanced
here. It tells us a great deal about creating a limited state through
a variety of mechanisms, such as the separation of powers or checks
and balances. It also tells us about making the state predictable,
and thus making it easier for individuals to avoid being punished or
otherwise damaged and harmed by the state. But it does not provide
us with many guidelines on how to diminish the propensity toward
violence, other than by imposing the sort of overwhelmingly coercive
sovereign that constitutions are supposed to guard us against.
This imbalance makes sense when the starting point is not a
fragile state but an absolute monarchy or a dictatorship, a very
specific form of too much use of the means of destruction. But in a
fragile state the potential use of the means of destruction typically
requires different measures.
It is useful to think of all constitutions as simultaneously being
peace treaties settling a war or a potential war, whether between
77. See Gregory S. Kavka, War of All Against All, 93 ETHICS 291 (1983) (discussing
Hobbes's Leviathan).
78. Id. at 304.
79. See Nicholas J. Wheeler & Tim Dunne, East Timor and the New Humanitarian
Interventionism, 77 INTL AFF. 805, 805 (2001).
80. See Dwight Y. King, East Timor's Founding Elections and Emerging Party System, 43
ASIAN SuRv. 745, 745-46 (2003).
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ethnic and nationality groups, regions, or classes. In the context of
fragile states this way of thinking becomes crucial. In defending the
Iraqi Constitution, I have said again and again: all constitutions are
in part peace treaties.81 Hence, we should think of the Iraqi
constitution as a peace treaty in the making.8 2 1 do not want to take
back anything I have said. But there is much that needs elabora-
tion. Constitutions need to be not simply peace treaties but, more
generally, effective mechanisms for diminishing the role of violence
and threat of violence in the politics of a country. Peace treaties can
be such mechanisms. But they are not the only ones. To understand
how constitutions ought to work, especially in fragile states, we
need to take a step back and consider more generally the forces that
strengthen the propensity for violence, and the variety of ways these
forces can be neutralized. This will tell us what commitments
should be part of constitution making.
A. Violence-producing Mechanisms
We can identify three mechanisms that can lead to violence. Let
us call them the logic of fear, the logic of optimistic ambitions, and
the logic of moral outrage. And we can identify for each a family of
interventions that can weaken or block the operation of each
mechanism.
Logic of Fear: The logic of fear begins operating when
the perceived first strike advantage in an inter-group
conflict is sufficiently strong." This will occur only in
settings where the underlying conflict between groups
is sufficiently great that there is much to gain from a
war and the strategic situation, that is, the distribution
of resources, is such that there is an advantage to
striking first.' A group then will attack first in order to
81. Karol Soltan, Think of It as a Treaty, NEWSDAY, Oct. 23, 2005, available at
http://www.krg.org/articles/detail.asp?smap=&lngnr=12&rnr=77&anr=6955.
82. Id.
83. Jack Snyder & Robert Jervis, Civil War and the Security Dilemma, in CIVIL WARS,
INSECURITY, AND INTERVENTION 15, 21 (Barbara F. Walter & Jack Snyder eds., 1999); Barry
R. Weingast, Constructing Trust: The Political and Economic Roots of Ethnic and Regional
Conflict, in INSTITUTIONS AND SOCIAL ORDER 163, 164-65 (Karol Soltan et al. eds., 1998).
84. See, e.g., Weingast, supra note 83, at 21-22.
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defend itself. Fear produces a preemptive, or preven-
tive, war."5 This logic was dramatically expressed by an
old woman in Sarajevo in the midst of the post-Yugoslav
wars: 'The Serbs will kill us all, we need to slaughter
them first."8
Logic of Optimistic Ambitions: We find this logic in
political movements confident that they are on the
verge of creating a Heaven on Earth. The prize is so
worthy that for these movements even the most ex-
treme sacrifices are worth imposing on others and on
themselves. Whereas the typical example of the logic of
fear will be found in ethnic wars, a typical example of
this logic will be found in ideological wars, with revolu-
tionary movements aiming at a deep transformation not
just in the political system, but in economics and society
at large. But ambitious ethnic groups, such as Serbs
demanding a Greater Serbia, or self-aggrandizing
thugs, such as Charles Taylor in Liberia, can also weigh
their costs and expected benefits and conclude in favor
of war.
Logic of Moral Outrage: Moral outrage, a product of
injury or humiliation, can be channeled and given
satisfaction in a variety of ways. Criminal prosecution
and truth and reconciliation commissions are two
prominent examples. But it can also fuel powerful
outbursts of violence.
Let me say something about what we can do to block each one of
these mechanisms, and in this way to promote a constitutionalist
commitment to moderation.
B. The Logic of Fear
We can distinguish two methods of keeping fear in check in
deeply divided societies. One method is for a dominant group to
85. Snyder & Jervis, supra note 83, at 22.
86. Erik Melander, Anarchy Within: The Security Dilemma Between Ethnic Groups in
Emerging Anarchy 215 (Uppsala Univ. Dep't of Peace and Conflict Research Report No. 52,
1999).
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keep all others subordinate. Fear leads to violence when it prompts
preventive or preemptive war. But fear of a hegemonic power does
not produce this response, because a preventive strike against a
hegemon has no chance of success. When the dominance of the
hegemonic group, which may be the state, declines, however, fear
begins to argue in favor of preemption and violence, unless some
alternative institutional framework is found. This happens typically
when the coercive capacity of the state falters, and the security
apparatus of the state is no longer capable of effective deterrence.
The declining effectiveness of the military and police constitutes a
key element in the initial conditions for the violence-generating
mechanism of the logic of fear to get started.
The most often used, and the most effective, alternative to
coercive hegemony as an instrument to block the logic of fear is
some form of consociational democracy, or "power sharing." It is
misleading, however, to think of power sharing as one alternative.
We have rather a wide variety of arrangements, which perform at
least two functions. They allow the groups involved in conflict to act
separately, without interference from others. And they also allow the
groups to act jointly, in a way that does not undermine the security
of any of them. This involves some combination of power sharing,
which includes checks and balances, veto powers, and organiza-
tional integration; power separation-mainly territorial and
personal autonomy; and resource sharing. The key is to combine
power sharing-the pure case being one in which each group retains
veto power over all central decisions-and power separation, which
involves shifting decisions out of the center, separating the groups
in conflict, and giving them decision-making power.
A security dilemma arises-in the standard account-when each
party builds up its military capacity to gain security, and in the
process diminishes the security of others. The security dilemma is
avoided if the military assets are purely defensive, such as walls or
fortifications. Having surrounded oneself by a wall, one can feel
more secure without threatening others. Boundaries that are hard
to cross have this effect, but so do other resources that work like
walls, fences, boundaries, or shields, as do resources that allow us
to hide or resources that give us mobility, allowing us to run. These
defensive weapons can also be institutional boundaries that are
hard to cross, establishing the autonomy of various sub-units of a
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polity. I will come to them in a moment. It should be remembered,
however, that hard-to-cross boundaries are not the only instrument
of separation. The capacity to run and to hide can be quite signifi-
cant, both politically and economically. The capacity of capital to
move across borders, often referred to as capital flight, can certainly
be important: When the Chinese in Indonesia started getting
massacred, Chinese capital moved out fairly quickly, giving extra
incentive for the government to stop the riots. 7
When we introduce significant internal boundaries in a political
system we can call the result "federal." There are many forms of
such federalism largely distinguished by the powers they allocate to
the center and those they distribute among the "pillars" or the
provinces. But we need to also make a more basic distinction
between territorial and nonterritorial-personal or corporate-
divisions.
In nonterritorial systems, boundaries are defined not territorially
but in terms of personal membership. A member of an ethnic or
religious group, for example, can be governed, on some issues, by his
or her "pillar" no matter where they live. If we want homogeneous
pillars, and the ethnic groups are not separated territorially, this is
the method of division that we must use. The pillars can be given
powers in areas where territoriality is not a significant constraint,
as in the provision of education. The Ottoman millet system is a
much-cited historical precedent.8 8 Among contemporary examples
are systems that give ethnic minorities the right to establish and
control their own schools, supported by public funds, as in Belgium
or India. 9 A voucher system could be seen as a more flexible
alternative-in which there is no need to negotiate ahead of time
which groups have this right and which do not-with each person
having a choice of education system to join, and all those systems
with sufficient membership to be viable gaining the support of the
87. See Anti-Chinese Riots Continue in Indonesia, CNN.coM, Aug. 29, 1998, http://www.
cnn.com/world/asiapcf/9808/29/indonesia.riot.
88. See, e.g., D.K. Fieldhouse, The Decline of the Ottoman Empire in the Middle East and
the 'Arab Awakening,' in WESTERN IMPERIALISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST 1914-1958, at 2-9 (2006);
see also John Coakley, Approaches to the Resolution of Ethnic Conflict: The Strategy of Non-
territorial Autonomy, 15 INT'L POL. SCI. REV. 297, 299 (1994).
89. See generally Keith Watson, Educational Policies in Multi-cultural Societies, 15 COMP.
EDUC. 17 (1979) (discussing national treatment of minorities regarding education).
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state.9" A different set of examples of nonterritorial decentralization
is provided in countries, like Lebanon and India, that recognize for
their various religious groups autonomous legal systems that govern
such matters as marriage and divorce, children, or inheritance.9'
The more common federal systems have internal divisions that
are territorial, and there are a variety of choices in boundary
determination. In many federal systems, state and ethnic group
boundaries mostly coincide, thus providing as large a degree of
autonomy to these groups as the powers given to the states in which
they live. Perhaps the purest examples are Belgium and Czechoslo-
vakia in its dying days.92 There are many more examples, such as
Switzerland,93 India,94 and Canada,95 where boundary determination
is more mixed, but often follows linguistic lines.
C. The Logic of Optimistic Ambitions
The propensity for violence of an individual or a group increases
with the gains-the improvements of the world, as they see it-they
are pursuing, and the more optimistic they are about achieving
those gains. Violence is costly, but the greater expected gains justify
the cost. To make an omelet, we need first to break some eggs, and
the bigger the omelet, the more eggs will have to be sacrificed. So
when deep political and social transformation enters the agenda of
major players, or when players with such an agenda become major,
the prospects of violence and of breakdown of constitutional order
increase.
There are two situations in which such an increased propensity
for violence is likely to occur. First, it is likely as a response to
deterioration, as in failing states. Second, it is also possible as a
response to emerging opportunities of improvement, as in revolu-
tions of rising expectations.
90. See Free To Choose, and Learn, ECONOMIST, May 3, 2007, at 65.
91. Margaret Moore, Sub-State Nationalism and International Law, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L.
1319, 1330 (2004).
92. Ronald L. Watts, Forward: States, Provinces, Ldnder, and Cantons: International
Variety Among Subnational Constitutions, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 941, 957 (2000) (discussing
Belgium).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 946.
95. Id. at 957.
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Two important examples of the latter pattern are familiar from
European history. The Renaissance unleashed an enthusiasm for
improvement and reform in many spheres of life, including religion.
But efforts to reform eventually led to increasingly brutal wars of
religion, in which the issues at stake were much bigger, and hence
worth fighting for, than the issues that prompted the original efforts
at reform.
A second prominent example can be found within the French
Revolution.96 The sequence of events that begins the revolution is
clearly a response to deterioration. But again, this provides an
opportunity for improvement on a scale much greater than the
original decline suggested, including a program of rationalization of
the state and the society, recognition of natural rights and new
principles of constitutional design, replacement of a monarchy with
a republic, and so on. And those large stakes then support the
political logic of turning to violence.
One way to undercut this logic of large stakes and optimistic
ambitions is to incrementalize programs for improvement and
transformation. Many examples of deep transformation success-
fully achieved without violence involve various forms of such
incrementalization, including transitions to democracy in Mexico,97
Spain,98 and Portugal;99 the collapse of communism in some
countries of Europe, for example Hungary,"° and in some respects
Poland;1 °' and the collapse of the apartheid regime in South
Africa. 0
2
A second way to undercut the logic of large stakes is to decentral-
ize improvement, and to establish programs of improvement
separate from the state. There are two key examples: civil societies
and the market. Both allow multiple individuals and groups to
96. See generally FRANCOIS-AUGUSTE MIGNET, HISTORYOFTHE FRENCH REVOLUTION FROM
1789-1814 (2006), available at Project Gutenberg, httpJ/www.gutenberg.orgletext9602.
97. Jos6 Woldenberg Karakowsky, Lessons from Mexico, 12 J. DEMOCRACY 151,155 (2000).
98. Nancy Bermeo, Redemocratization and Transition Elections: A Comparison of Spain
and Portugal, 19 COMP. POL. 213, 218-19 (1987); Omar G. Encarnaci6n, Civil Society and the
Consolidation of Democracy in Spain, 116 POL. SCI. Q. 53, 60 (2001).
99. Bermeo, supra note 98, at 214-18.
100. Duncan Light, Grazing on Communism: Heritage Tourism and Post-Communist
Identities in Germany, Hungary, and Romania, 2 TOURISM GEOGRAPHIES 157, 166-67 (2000).
101. Andrzej Walicki, Totalitarianism and Detotalitarization: The Case of Poland, 58 REV.
POL. 505, 521-24 (1996).
102. Hermann Giliomee, Democratization in South Africa, 110 POL. ScI. Q. 83,87-88 (1995).
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invest time, money, energy, and other resources into making a
better world by their ingenuity. Instead of a central authority
controlling all investment decisions, making the stakes at the center
immense, you have in a market multiple smaller actors making
smaller decisions. And at the heart of civil society we find a similar
decentralization of efforts to improve the world, though in this case
not driven by the profit motive.
D. The Logic of Moral Outrage
We find the most dramatic efforts to respond constructively to
moral outrage in situations where a great deal of this outrage has
accumulated-for example, when a thoroughly outrageous regime
has just collapsed, or a genocidal war has just ended. The response
has been some combination of the following elements:
1. Criminal justice: Nuremburg, Yugoslavia, Rwanda 3
2. Amnesty and reconciliation
3. Establishing the truth about the past
4. Restitution, rehabilitation, compensation
5. Purifying the body politic: denazification, lustration, etc.
This list gives us a good idea of the range of choices available to deal
with moral outrage. To understand what needs to be done, it helps
to keep in mind that courts, and the criminal justice system in
general, including police and prosecutors, are at the heart of the
task of preventing the accumulation of moral outrage in a well-
functioning state. A typical reason for the accumulation of moral
outrage is that some group in the population is protected from the
reach of criminal law, or some range of activities is illegitimately
protected. Some people and some criminal activities are de facto
above the law.
The solution is some combination of, first, repairing the routine
means of response to moral outrage, and second, establishing
extraordinary means of response that have sufficient neutrality and
effectiveness. An example of the first strategy would be a reform of
103. See WILLIAM A. ScHABAS, THE U.N. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS: THE FORMER
YUGOSLAVIA, RWANDA AND SIERRA LEONE (2006).
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the court system, of criminal law and procedure, or of the police. An
example of the second strategy would be a special investigatory
commission set up in response to a scandal.
Moral outrage can have powerful distorting effects on people's
perception of reality, and it is itself subject to powerful distortions.
It can be therefore the basis of very distorted analyses of how the
offending injury or humiliation occurred, and how responsibility
for it ought to be allocated. This is why the determination of facts
is such a central feature of the courts of law. And it is why this
feature is preserved in the various 'Truth and Reconciliation"
commissions.' 4 More generally, moral outrage cannot properly be
handled without neutral and effective-in other words, thorough
and reliable-investigative efforts, whether it is in courts, investiga-
tive commissions, or by journalists and historians.
V. NEUTRAL GROUND
The second task of constitutions is to enhance the role and
influence of multiple legitimate ends, impersonal principles, and
impartial institutions or persons. To do this is to diminish the bite
of Madison's "problem of faction."'0 5 Madison wrote in Federalist No.
10:
No man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause; because his
interest would certainly bias his judgment .... With equal, nay
with greater reason, a body of men, are unfit to be both judges
and parties, at the same time; yet, what are many of the most
important acts of legislation, but so many judicial determina-
tions ... concerning the rights of large bodies of citizens .106
This problem can be solved only to the extent that we can arrange
governmental institutions, and their social context, in such a way
that impartial principles, neutral decision makers, and impartial
institutions have a chance to exist and to be effective in influencing
104. For an example, see Truth and Reconciliation Commission, http://www. doj.gov.za/trc
(last visited Feb. 22, 2008).
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outcomes. We must build neutral ground, which can include
institutions of various kinds, including, of course, the institutions of
the state, as well as persons, groups, ideas, places, and even objects
that are seen as neutral within the most important and divisive
conflicts in a country. In a deeply divided country we may find no
neutral ground at all: no impartial persons, institutions, or ideas. By
contrast, in countries with highly developed neutral ground, the
state will be both neutral-or at least neutral enough-and
powerful, so that the institutions of the state, and its officials, will
constitute a powerful neutral ground.
In modern constitutional democracies, the power of impartial
principles takes the form of a commitment to free and fair elections,
one person/one vote, equal human dignity, and basic human rights.
In fragile states, we must build toward such commitments in stages,
which include introduction of the appropriate legal forms and
building social realities that can eventually give these forms the
appropriate principled content. We might call this building neutral
ground. It includes institutional neutral ground, for example,
impartial media-especially radio stations; autonomous professional
associations--especially lawyers; and autonomous universities.
Building a cultural neutral ground would be even deeper, trans-
forming human attitudes to allow for more impartial "loyalties to
what the situation requires"' v in addition to existing group
loyalties. And building neutral ground includes strengthening the
role of moderate politicians, those capable of fairness and impartial-
ity, and those willing to compromise.
'Why do you hire only people from your tribe?" an African
politician in office was once asked,18 in an effort to understand the
roots of the corrupt practices that make effective governing so
difficult in many African countries. "Who else would hire them?" he
answered, providing a vivid example of what happens when the idea
of impartiality is so weak that hiring on the basis of merit is not
even an alternative to be seriously considered. Before we can get a
107. I paraphrase Justice Brandeis. See ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, BRANDEIS: A FREE MAN'S
LIFE 232-37 (1956) (In response to an accusation of unethical conflict of interest and an
inquiry as to who he represented, Brandeis replied, "I should say that I was counsel for the
situation.").




constitutional court to challenge political institutions on the
grounds of high universal principle, we need to have a social setting
in which something other than protecting one's own is imaginable;
otherwise high principle will have no chance to be seen as such. It
will be only the Tutsis favoring the Tutsis, or the rich favoring the
rich.
Neutral ground is composed of those elements of the social life of
the country that are nonpartisan in ways relevant to the social
conditions of that country, and that contain a range of neutral
legitimating factors such as legality, erudition, and technical or
professional competence. Neutral ground may need to be built up
wherever it happens to be found. This could be anywhere from the
traditional monarch to the association of market women, from a
university and a professional association to the soccer league.
In a country with a well-functioning legitimate state, the state
will be perceived as relevantly neutral, or at least neutral enough,
and will dominate neutral ground. But when we are starting from
nothing, we may not be able, for example, to establish independent
and neutral courts or bureaucracies because there are no judges or
civil servants who are seen as neutral in relevant ways.
Neutrality requires at least two elements: (1) a relevant form of
nonpartisanship in the large conflicts of the society, and (2) no or
limited corruption, which is another form of nonpartisanship of a
more personal kind. The effectiveness of neutral ground requires, in
addition, that the key decision makers have the relevant skills and
that the institutional arrangements give them incentives to exercise
those skills, and make it possible to exercise them effectively.
A widely accepted conclusion in the literature is that when the
state is not ethnically neutral, civil war is likely.' °9 This conclusion
needs to be both expanded and disaggregated. If we stick to large-
scale abstractions, then we should say that not only an ethnically
neutral state, but also an ethnically neutral market, are important
for preventing civil war."0 But especially for practical purposes it is
useful to look into the component parts of the state, and outside the
state, for the necessary neutral ground.
109. See Robin M. Williams, Jr., The Sociology of Ethnic Conflicts: Comparative
International Perspectives, 20 ANN. REV. SOc. 49, 50 (1994).
110. AMY CHUA, WORLD ON FIRE: How EXPORTING FREE MARKET DEMOCRACY BREEDS
ETHNIc HATRED AND GLOBAL INSTABILITY 260-64 (1st ed. 2003).
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Potential elements of neutral ground include government
institutions (such as courts), constitutional enforcement institutions
(courts or otherwise), independent professional civil service,
nonpartisan professional military and police, and independent
central banks or electoral commissions. Other institutions independ-
ent of government, such as universities, an autonomous legal
profession, or independent media, can also be part of this neutral
ground. In the larger social context we may include in this category
political moderates, in the most divisive conflicts, and people with
a hybrid, intermediate, or uncertain identity. When the key social
conflicts are between the haves and the have-nots we would also
include "the middle class." Social scientists used to believe that a
large middle class was crucial for a stable democracy."' This does
not appear to be true, but a large and powerful neutral ground does
seem to help.
CONCLUSION
Constitution making everywhere is the development and
strengthening of commitments to moderate politics. This operates
through entrenched legal texts, but only in part. It requires
incentives favoring moderate politicians, whenever that has a
chance of being effective. But, in general, it will not be enough. We
need to rethink democracy to give a complex demos the central place
it deserves. And we need both to undermine the power of the gun,
and to promote neutral ground. These are the main lessons we
should learn from the experience of constitution making at the
edges of constitutional order.
111. See, e.g., Seymour M. Lipset, Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic
Development and Political Legitimacy, 53 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 69, 83 (1959).
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